CVE-2016-2107
Public exploit code exists, so attacks usually follow. Schedule the vendor fix ahead of your normal cycle.
What it is
The AES-NI implementation in OpenSSL before 1.0.1t and 1.0.2 before 1.0.2h does not consider memory allocation during a certain padding check, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive cleartext information via a padding-oracle attack against an AES CBC session. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incorrect fix for CVE-2013-0169.
Live exploitation on the huntback network (30 days)
Detection
Evidence
Weaponised. Exploit code is public but no exploitation is reported yet.
Published
Exploit code published (ExploitDB)
Observed: our own decoys saw it. Reported: CISA, the vendor or another named source says so. Weaponised: public exploit code or a scanner template exists. Methodology
Questions
Is CVE-2016-2107 being exploited in the wild?
Not on our sensors so far: the huntback decoy network has not captured an exploitation attempt, and it is not in the CISA KEV catalogue.
Can CVE-2016-2107 be detected on the network?
huntback has no wire signature for CVE-2016-2107 yet; it may need local or authenticated access to exploit.
How huntback helps
Deploy a decoy that emulates Android and you will see every attempt at this CVE the moment it lands, with the full payload, the attacker's infrastructure, and any stage-2 loader. Then huntback can scan the attacker back.
Related
NVD record → Browse all CVEs → Live malware and C2 finds → Novel-attack discovery → Deploy a decoy →API
This record, with its evidence timeline, as JSON:
curl -H "X-API-Key: $HUNTBACK_KEY" https://app.huntback.io/api/v1/evidence/CVE-2016-2107