Blog · Threat intel · · 11 min read · by huntback Research

Your open admin panel is on this list: 443,706 targets queued by a single exploitation factory

A server that attacked one of our Node-RED decoys on 17 November 2026 also left its working directory open to the internet. It holds a complete production line for mass exploitation: 89 campaign folders, a library of 85 exploit kits, target lists built from search engine queries, run logs, and an implant with its own control panel. The project has a name, dadian1000, and a number to reach: 1,000 hosts with the implant running. One of its scripts exists only to keep honeypots out of that count. Our decoy went through it, was logged as a hit, and was fired at again every half hour for a day. This post reads the two records side by side: what the operator wrote down, and what our decoy received.

In brief

  • Dadian (打点) is Chinese red-team slang for gaining a first foothold. The project state file is initialised with --target 1000 --metric onboard: the goal is 1,000 hosts with the implant reporting to the panel, counted per round.
  • The target lists hold 443,706 distinct targets (address and port), and the queue files list 65 Shodan queries and 12 FOFA queries to build them. The kits marked 8,531 of those targets as hit.
  • A hit is not a host. The stager logs show 2,280 addresses fetching the stager, 578 reporting a successful launch and 516 reporting a failure.
  • Before a large pool is fired in full, a script fires a 150-host sample, waits 150 seconds, and asks the panel how many of the hits registered. Many hits with zero registrations and the pool is written off as a "honeypot farm".
  • The filter judges pools, not hosts. Our decoy sat in a pool of real servers, so it stayed in 47 of the operator's target and hit lists and kept receiving the payload.
  • On our decoy we watched the delivery command change five times in 51 minutes while the operator debugged why hits were not turning into implants.
  • The server has an AI coding agent installed and the tooling is written for several agents working from a shared task board.
fire_gated.sh: how a pool of more than 200 targets is handled1. poolShodan or FOFA queryone per exploit kiturl.txt2. sample150 random targets30 workerssample/hit.txt3. ask the panelwait 150 secondswhich hits registered?attribute.pyfire the restany registered, or under 15 hitsskip the pool15 or more hits, none registereda skipped pool is marked FARM_SKIPPED and never fired again
The gate decides on the whole pool. A single decoy inside a pool of real servers passes with them.

A project with a number to hit

The server is 130.94.37[.]220. Its clock runs on China Standard Time, its notes and code comments are in Chinese, and the scripts carry paths from the operator's own Mac: the campaign root is a Desktop folder named 打点 under the user hackma. The same user name is compiled into the implant. All times below are UTC.

The tooling is organised as a pipeline with state:

FileWhat it does
cve_radar.pyPulls recent critical CVEs and the CISA KEV list and scores each one for being remote, unauthenticated, code execution, and easy to fingerprint on a search engine.
scout_pool.pyWalks the exploit library and picks kits that already have an exploit and an analysis report, skipping products that were used before.
board.pyA task board for several agents: cards of type cve_repro, audit, campaign and verify, claimed atomically so two workers never take the same job.
recon_pull.pyTurns a search query into url.txt, the target pool for one kit.
exp_runner.pyThe firing skeleton every kit shares: worker threads, a proxy for all traffic, hit.txt, fail.txt and a run_<time>.json summary.
campaign_state.pyThe scoreboard: target, rounds, hosts onboarded per vulnerability, and a list of rejected candidates so effort is not spent twice.

The scoreboard is where the name comes from. A project is started with campaign_state.py init --target 1000 --metric onboard, and each round closes with the number of hosts fired at, hit, and onboarded. One saved round file, for a set of network-edge flaws, reads: target 1,000, achieved 0, with the reasons written out per product ("payload rejected (patched)", "surface too small").

One rule is written into every script: no proxy, no firing. The proxy script tests each exit by fetching the NVD website, and the runner stops with "no usable proxy, firing in the open is forbidden" when the test fails. On the server itself the proxy is a local relay, and the requests our decoy received came from the server's own address.

The server also has a general-purpose AI coding agent installed, Claude Code 2.1.325, configured on 15 November to send its requests to DeepSeek's API instead (models deepseek-flash and deepseek-v4-pro). The only sessions saved on the server are five connectivity tests from that day: reply "OK", run echo HELLO_FROM_DEEPSEEK. The set-up note beside them says the key is a different one from "the key the ARTEX platform uses", and the crontab runs scheduled jobs from an ARTEX install under /opt/artex-god. The task board, with its agent names and card types, is built for that kind of worker. We have written before about AI agents running offensive work and about an ARTEX fork that learned to spot honeypots.

The library: 85 kits, most of them open doors

Each kit is a folder named after the product and the flaw. 80 of the 85 carry an analysis report written to one template, ending in a table of "hard gates" the finding had to pass: reachable with no credentials, no victim interaction, present in the vendor's default configuration, at most two separate flaws in the chain, proven on the latest release, and a count of exposed instances on FOFA.

That template explains the selection. Few of these are memory corruption bugs. Most are management interfaces that ship without authentication:

  • Data platforms: Apache Doris, Druid, Flink, Hadoop YARN, HugeGraph, IoTDB, Livy, Pulsar, Solr, Zeppelin, Airflow, DolphinScheduler.
  • AI and notebook tooling: Flowise, Langflow, FastGPT, Ray, Jupyter, marimo.
  • Media and home automation: go2rtc, Monibuca, ZLMediaKit, Volumio, ESPHome, ioBroker, Node-RED.
  • Terminals left open: ttyd, GoTTY, noVNC desktops, the Docker API on port 2375.
  • Chinese enterprise software: Yonyou NC Cloud, Kingdee EAS, Inspur iGIX, TongWeb, Dahua ICC.

A second set of folders tracks numbered flaws in edge products as they are published: F5 BIG-IP (CVE-2026-94127), vCenter (CVE-2026-59310), BeyondTrust (CVE-2026-1731), cPanel (CVE-2026-41940), PaperCut, N-central.

The Node-RED report is typical. It records about 80,275 instances on FOFA and describes three anonymous requests: read the flows, post them back with an exec node added, trigger it. On Siemens IoT2050 gateways the same open editor is tracked as CVE-2026-581151.

The honeypot filter

The first full runs, on 17 November, used no filter. The HugeGraph kit reported 1,432 hits from 1,786 targets in under three minutes, a hit rate of 80 percent. The next file the operator wrote was canary_probe.py, described in its first line as a way to "verify execution truth": it sends a sample of the hit hosts a command that calls back to the server with the target's address in the path.

The callbacks came. There were 30 of them, for 27 targets, from 28 different addresses, and not one came from the address that had been attacked. The command was being run somewhere else: collected by one system and executed by another.

The answer was fire_gated.sh, whose first comment reads "sample gate: big pools fire 150-sample first, require panel registration". Its decision is in the figure above. It was running within minutes of the canary test, and within the hour it wrote this line (the time is the server's own, 15:21:58 UTC):

[FARM-SKIP] PowerJob_OpenAPI... sample_hit=63 registered=0
            pool judged honeypot farm 23:21:58

Sixty-three of 150 PowerJob targets accepted the exploit and none started the implant, so the rest of that pool was not fired in that run. The same reasoning appears in the round notes for vCenter, where the exploit ran commands on three hosts and no implant arrived: "surface is any-port honeypot/detonation".

A later test asks the same question of single hosts. For one campaign, ab_test.sh lists the hosts that were hit but never fetched the stager, 1,022 at the time, fires a sample of 150 again and checks the web log two minutes later. The result line: fetch-after = 0.

What the filter measures is worth stating plainly. It does not fingerprint a honeypot. It measures whether a pool of targets behaves like real servers do after code execution: they download the next stage and they keep running it.

From hit to host: the conversion problem

Real servers gave the operator a different problem. Around midday on 18 November a script compared each campaign's hit list with the list of hosts on the panel and counted the addresses that had been hit but had never registered: 941 across 17 campaigns.

CampaignHit, but not on the panel
Node-RED334
go2rtc219
noVNC desktop128
Monibuca75
Flowise72
PowerJob48

So the stager was rebuilt to report on itself. Each stage sends a short request back to the server: architecture and user id, whether curl or wget exists, the HTTP status and size of the download, the exit code of the implant. The log fills with paths such as /r/s2_x64_h404_z0 (the download returned 404), /r/s4_rc137_Killed (the implant was killed as it started) and /r/s4_rc127 (the file would not execute). The stager on disk is marked v6, a second one v8, and eleven earlier copies are kept beside them.

The same hunt is visible from our side. The first payload our decoy received, at 20:21:07 on 17 November, piped a script from the operator's download host into a shell. The next morning the command changed five times in 51 minutes:

First seen, 18 NovWhat changed in the command
07:20:35Downloads the implant directly, picking the build from uname -m, and starts it with TD_PROJ=dadian1000 and --bypass.
07:33:09Tries /var/tmp, then /dev/shm, then the home directory when the first is not writable.
07:40:31Adds setsid, which detaches the implant from the Node-RED process that started it.
07:48:45Replaced by one line: fetch stg.sh from the campaign server and pipe it to a shell.
08:11:55The same with a wget fallback. This version stayed.

From then on the hit lists were re-fired on a timer. From the afternoon of 18 November until 06:00 the next morning our decoy received the same three requests every half hour: GET /flows, POST /flows, and POST /inject/injpwn followed by six random hex characters. The decoy's address is in 47 of the operator's target and hit lists. It was never skipped, because the pool around it was real: 486 hits from 62,447 Node-RED targets is a rate no filter of this kind would question.

By the operator's own web logs, between 16 and 19 November 2,280 addresses fetched a stager script and 1,718 fetched an implant binary. 578 sent the final "ok" request, which carries the host name, and 516 sent a failure report.

One flow file, two operators

The Node-RED exploit reads the existing flows and posts them back with its own nodes added. Our decoy already held flows planted by a different operator, whose nodes fetch a dropper from 147.182.248[.]124:38181 every 600 seconds and whose node ids begin with xi, on a tab labelled x. The campaign kit's own nodes sit on a tab labelled pwn. Each time either operator returned, it re-posted the other's nodes with its own. A server exposed this way does not get one intruder. It gets a queue, and each one preserves the work of the last.

The campaign server also sent its Apache Doris configuration exploit to firewall decoys of ours, which are not Doris and never claimed to be. Pools are built from a search engine fingerprint, and whatever answers on the matching port is fired at.

The implant

The implant is called td-agent. It is a statically linked Rust program of about 1.6 MB, built for x64, x86, arm64, armv7 and armv6, with a PHP version and a Windows stager beside it.

  • Control: the host cdn.876553[.]xyz is compiled in. The binary carries TLS, WebSocket, TCP and UDP transports and reads its settings from environment variables that start with TD_.
  • Project tag: TD_PROJ labels each host on the panel. Two tags are in use: dadian1000 and quanliang2026 (全量, "full volume").
  • Commands: the strings name shell sessions, command execution, upload, download, listeners and a tunnel.
  • Persistence: a crontab entry, every two or three minutes depending on the stager version, that restarts the binary when no process has --bypass on its command line, and an @reboot entry.
  • Location: /var/tmp/.td-agent, or the home directory or /tmp when that fails. The Windows stager saves it as %TEMP%\svchost.exe.

What to check

  1. Find the management interfaces you expose. Every large campaign here targets an admin API that answers without credentials: the Node-RED editor on 1880, go2rtc on 1984, Flowise, the Docker API on 2375, Flink, YARN, Druid, Doris on 8040, ttyd and GoTTY. If a search engine can find it, it is in a pool.
  2. Node-RED: enable adminAuth2. Open the editor and look for tabs you did not create (here they were labelled pwn and x), exec nodes whose command is sh, and inject nodes with ids beginning injpwn or xi. Flows hold credentials for brokers and databases: rotate them.
  3. On the host: look for /var/tmp/.td-agent, /var/tmp/.tda, /var/tmp/.sx, /tmp/.cache_* and /tmp/.td-agent.lock, and for any process started with --bypass.
  4. Crontab: an entry that lists /proc/[0-9]*/cmdline and greps for --bypass is the watchdog.
  5. Egress: connections to cdn.876553[.]xyz or 130.94.37[.]220, and downloads made by curl presenting the user agent Wget/1.21.4.
  6. Expect more than one visitor. If one set of planted nodes is there, read the whole flow file. Ours held two operators' work at once.

Indicators

IndicatorRoleConfidence
130.94.37[.]220Campaign server: source of the exploit requests, stager host on port 80, report listeners on 8000, 9090 and 19999High
cdn.876553[.]xyzImplant download and control host, compiled into the binary; stager path /Q1fc8a9OCb7AsC6f/dl/<uuid>High
78e78dbcaf5a0ffd57f48b9c98855e72.r2.cloudflarestorage[.]comStorage bucket serving the implant through pre-signed linksHigh
http://130.94.37[.]220/stg.sh, /stg2.sh, /agent_dl.bin, /bin/agent-linux-<arch>Stager scripts and implant mirrorsHigh
/r/ok_<hostname>, /r/s1_ to /r/s6, /failRequests an infected host sends to the campaign serverHigh
21bd348c207a314a048f94384d6c74e4f077a89723b9aa279e039146c0e46f4etd-agent, x64High
a6eb22c1d2fa9dfd59790ca0412d37707221ae56cff177926ddfb7e2a6854091td-agent, x64, served as agent_dl.binHigh
0966be8424df836efcfb3fb05537f2f82cf6ba4a3abd45a495ea97c888f6d621td-agent, arm64High
c4429115710e73689da775bc0965f301e6ac3b497280c635ef3dc1cd3ce33fd4td-agent, armv7High
44babfec79942717b196435376d782823493ab4571adb0b9c606812cc6f0d1e7agent.php, the PHP implantHigh
797032017bd297ad575b2f9b71a018d32a91b8f122f5706a64932ed67d1ca6destg.sh (v6)High
02d150e4a3801d3f8f3ceb00d4e2d2a88f24e7701d1479642d1c98e9358e9ea6win.ps1, the Windows stagerHigh
TD_PROJ=dadian1000, TD_PROJ=quanliang2026, argument --bypassEnvironment and command line of the running implantHigh
POST /inject/injpwn<6 hex>0000 with user agent Mozilla/5.0The Node-RED kit triggering its command nodePattern
147.182.248[.]124:38181Dropper host of the second operator found in the same flow fileHigh for the event

References

  1. Siemens ProductCERT, SSA-834709, and CVE Program, CVE-2026-58115: SIMATIC IoT2050 with Node-RED installed (published 11 August 2026).
  2. Node-RED documentation, Securing Node-RED.